Promising - One study
Date: This profile was posted on November 21, 2011
A violence prevention program that uses a public health approach, using trained street violence interrupters and outreach workers, public education campaigns, and community mobilization to reduce shootings and killings. This program is rated Promising. The program was associated with significant reductions in shootings, killings, and retaliatory homicides and also appeared to make shooting hot spots cooler in some neighborhoods but not others.
Program Goals/Target Population
Cure Violence (formerly known as CeaseFire-Chicago) is a Chicago, Illinois–based violence prevention program administered by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention. Cure Violence uses an evidence-based public health approach to reduce shootings and killings by using highly trained street violence interrupters and outreach workers, public education campaigns, and community mobilization. Rather than aiming to directly change the behaviors of a large number of individuals, Cure Violence concentrates on changing the behavior and risky activities of a small number of selected members of the community who have a high chance of either "being shot" or "being a shooter" in the immediate future.
Three causal factors are emphasized in the program theory underlying Cure Violence: norms, decisions, and risks. These were seen as three "levers" that could be "pulled" to stop shootings in the city. Cure Violence's interventions are based on a coherent theory of behavior that specifies the "inputs" to be assembled and set in motion and how they cause the "outcomes," including reductions in shootings and killings. Many of the program’s daily activities target the causal factors linking inputs to outcomes, which were presumed to be among the major determinates of violence. The causal factors that are believed to contribute to violence include community norms, availability of on-the-spot alternatives to resorting to violence when the situation arises, and awareness of the risks and costs associated with violence.
The activities of Cure Violence are organized into five core components, which address both the community and those individuals who are most at risk of involvement in a shooting or killing:
The program aims to change operative norms regarding violence, both in the wider community and among its clients through community mobilization, a public education campaign, and mentoring efforts of outreach workers who attempt to influence beliefs about the appropriateness of violence. Outreach workers are charged with stimulating norm change among clients and guiding them toward alternatives to shooting as a way of solving problems. Outreach workers counsel a small group of young clients, who are recruited from the streets and not through institutions, and connect them to a range of services. The outreach workers also conduct a significantly high number of conflict mediations. The efforts of the clergy and residents of the community are also aimed primarily at norm change, both in the community and among clients of the outreach workers and other high-risk youths. Community involvement also targets the perceived costs of violence. The public education campaign seeks both to change violence-related norms and to enhance the perception of the risks of engaging in violence.
- Street-level outreach
- Public education
- Community mobilization
- Faith leader (clergy) involvement
- Police and prosecutor participation
In addition, the program provides on-the-spot alternatives to violence when gangs and individuals on the street are making behavior decisions. The program treats young people as rational actors capable of making choices, and the strategy is to promote their consideration of a broader array of response to situations that too often elicit shootings and killings as a problem-solving tactic. Violence interrupters work on the streets alone or in pairs to mediate conflicts between gangs and stem the cycle of retaliatory violence that threatens to break out following a shooting. Violence interrupters work the street at night, talking to gang leaders, distraught friends and relatives of recent shooting victims, and others who are positioned to initiate or sustain cycles of violence.
Finally, the program aims to increase the perception of risks and costs of involvement in violence among high-risk, mostly young people. This reflects a classic deterrence model of human behavior, with risks such as incarceration, injury, and death highlighted for youth. Actions by the police and prosecutors, as well as tougher antigun legislation, are seen as targeting the risks surrounding involvement in shootings.
Skogan and colleagues (2008) found that the Cure Violence intervention (known as CeaseFire-Chicago at the time of the study) was associated with decreases in shootings, killings, and retaliatory homicides, and appeared to make shooting hot spots cooler in some neighborhoods but not others. Overall, the results were mixed.
In four areas, there was a statistically significant decrease in the number of all shots (measured as the number of gun-related batteries and assaults reported to police) that was associated with the introduction of Cure Violence. These areas included Auburn Green (17.4 percent decline in all shootings), Logan Square (21.7 percent decline), Southwest (24.2 percent decline), and West Garfield Park (24.4 percent decline).
There was a statistically significant decrease in the number of all shots in West Humboldt Park as well (13.2 percent), but there was a comparable decline in the matched comparison area so it was unknown if the reduction observed in West Humboldt Park could be attributed to the Cure Violence intervention or if this was a result of the overall decrease in crime that was occurring across the entire city of Chicago at the same time. In Rogers Park and Englewood, there were no significant declines. Cure Violence appears to have contributed to a reduction in the number of all shots in four of the seven communities.
There was consistent evidence of an effect of Cure Violence on the number of actual shootings (measured as gun-related batteries and assaults combined with gun-related homicides known to police) in three areas: West Garfield Park (23.4 percent decline), Southwest (26.6 percent decline), and Englewood (34.5 percent decline). In these areas, there were no significant declines in shootings in the matched comparison areas that paralleled the significant declines in the program areas.
There was also a significant decline in actual shootings in Auburn Gresham (down 19.6 percent), Logan Square (down 20.7 percent), and West Humboldt Park (down 15.7 percent). But there were similar drops occurring in the matched comparison areas as well. Rogers Park saw no significant decline in actual shootings. Cure Violence appears to have contributed to a reduction in actual shootings in three of the seven communities.
The program contributed to the decline in gun homicides in only one of the seven study sites (Auburn Gresham), where the decline in the program area was twice that in the comparison area. In Rogers Park and West Garfield Park there were significant declines in killings, but those results corresponded to declines in the matched comparison areas and could not be attributed to Cure Violence. In all other program areas, there were no significant declines in killings. Cure Violence appears to have contributed to a reduction in killings in only one of the seven communities.
Crime Hot Spots
Analysis of crime hot spots contrasted shooting patterns before and after the introduction of Cure Violence. In every program area there was a significant decline in the median density of shootings (measured as shootings per square mile) in the 2 years following the introduction of Cure Violence. In four of the seven areas—Auburn Gresham, Southwest, West Garfield Park, and West Humboldt Park—there was evidence that decreases in the size and intensity of shooting hot spots were linked to the introduction of Cure Violence. For instance, West Garfield Park experienced a 24 percent decline in median shooting density, compared with 5 percent in the comparison areas, while Southwest had a 30 percent decline in median shooting density compared with 5 percent in the comparison areas.
The analysis of gang-related homicides within and among gangs found that for all program areas there was no significant drop in gang homicides using the most basic indicator of change. However, the percentage change in the overall level of activity within gang networks declined significantly more for three of the seven programs areas than the matched comparison areas. These three areas were Auburn Gresham (28 percent change), Englewood (42 percent change), and West Humboldt Park (58 percent change). The level of activity in the remaining program areas either increased or did not decrease as much as the comparison area.
There was a significantly greater drop in the average gang involvement in murder for three program areas—Auburn Gresham (40 percent decline), Southwest (11 percent decline), and East Garfield Park (12 percent decline)—compared with the matched comparison areas. There were marginal differences between two programs areas (Englewood and West Humboldt Park) and the matched comparison areas, while two program areas (Logan Square and Rogers Park) actually had increases in gang involvement in murder.
The proportion of gang homicides that were reciprocal in nature (killings in retaliation for earlier events) decreased significantly more in five program areas (Auburn Gresham, Englewood, Logan Square, Southwest, and East Garfield Park) than in comparison areas. In these five program areas, there was a 100 percent reduction in retaliation killings.
The 2008 evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago (now known as Cure Violence) by Skogan and colleagues included three types of methodologies to assess the impact of the program on shootings and killings: time-series analysis, hot-spot mapping, and network analysis. The time-series analyses used archival data on selected program sites and matched comparison areas to examine trends in violence in Chicago, Illinois. Crime mapping techniques were used to examine the impact of the introduction of the program on short-term trends in the microlevel distribution of shootings. Social network analyses examined the effect of CeaseFire on networks of within-gang and between-gang homicides and the number of violent gangs active in the area. Because crime in Chicago had plummeted during the study period, the emphases of the evaluation were on whether crime was further down, if crime hot spots had moved around or cooled visibly, and if networks of gang homicide weakened more in the program sites than in comparison areas, following the implementation of the program. The comparison areas represented the known and unknown factors that were behind the general decline in crime in the city and helped isolate the independent effects of CeaseFire. Crime trends in comparison areas provided a baseline to be contrasted with trends in the program areas.
A time-series analysis was used to compare preprogram and postprogram data across seven CeaseFire program sites with comparison areas that were not being served by CeaseFire during the same period. The seven sites in Chicago were Auburn Gresham, Englewood, Logan Square, Rogers Park, Southwest, West Garfield Park, and West Humboldt Park. The vast majority of residents in these areas were African American or Latino. The seven sites had been in operation long enough to accumulate comparable and lengthy postprogram data series by the end of 2006. The overall average postprogram period was 59.3 months, ranging from 33 to 79 months. For most areas, there was a total of 192 months of data (16 years). The comparison areas were identified by matching CeaseFire areas with police beats with similar demographic features, including racial composition, family organization, poverty, and home ownership. There were on average three comparison beats series for each of the seven CeaseFire sites. The comparison areas essentially represented the hosts of known and unknown factors that lie behind the general decline in crime being seen across the entire city, which helped in isolating the independent effects of CeaseFire.
The crime data were aggregated from a citywide database that included 9.2 million individual incidents of all kinds reported to the Chicago police from January 1991 through December 2006. The outcome measures were killings and shootings. Killings are defined as homicides involving a firearm. Shootings included "all shots"” (incidents identified by Chicago police as aggravated batteries with a firearm combined with aggravated assaults with a firearm) and "actual shootings" (gun-related aggravated batteries combined with gun homicides).
Two different statistical models were used to analyze the data on shootings and killings. The analysis of the data on shootings used a Box–Jenkins–Tiao Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average Intervention Analysis to examine the contrasting shooting trends in the program and comparison group areas. Poisson regression analyses were used to examine the impact of the trends in gun-related killings between program and comparison group areas.
The hot-spot analysis looked at the distribution of crime data across space within the program and comparison areas. Crime data was used for a 2-year period before and during the implementation of CeaseFire in an area to ensure that the maps were based on enough observations to establish clear before and after patterns and to reliably identify changes in patterns over time. The analysis of before and after shooting densities also compared the percentage of the program and comparison beats’ land area that fell in each of the seven ranges of "dangerousness" measured by the density of shootings per square mile.
The analysis of gang homicide networks used graph theory and social network analysis that examined possible disruptive effects of the program in contrast to trends in comparison areas. Social network analysis maps the social landscape of gangs within a given area (which gangs are present, with whom they are in conflict, when violence occurs, and the intensity of conflict). The unit of analysis was the gang, not the gang members, and the analysis used police data on "gang related" homicides from 1994 through 2006.
There is no cost information available for this program.
Information on the Cure Violence program sites (formerly known as CeaseFire-Chicago), hosting organizations, staffing and funding of the program, client outreach, and community partners is available in the 2008 full report
by Skogan, Hartnett, Bump, and Dubois. Additional information about the program can be found on the Cure Violence Web site
Evidence-Base (Studies Reviewed)
These sources were used in the development of the program profile:Study 1
Skogan, Wesley G., Susan M. Hartnett, Natalie Bump, and Jill Dubois. 2008. Evaluation of CeaseFire—Chicago
. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/227181.pdf
Following are CrimeSolutions.gov-rated practices that are related to this program:Reducing Gun Violence
Reducing gun violence is a persistent public policy concern for communities, policymakers and leaders. To reduce gun violence, several strategies have been deployed including public health approaches (e.g., training and safe gun storage); gun buy-back programs; gun laws; and law enforcement strategies. The practice is rated Promising for reducing violent gun offenses.Evidence Ratings for Outcomes:
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